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There are several fundamental reasons why the state should not involve itself in the 
regulation of the press.  However, there are also more practical reasons why self-
regulation can be a preferable alternative, benefitting journalists and the public 
alike.  It is flexible, non-bureaucratic and highly effective at delivering practical 
solutions to problems. Ultimately, self-regulation can raise standards and provide 
effective redress to those who are wronged by the press.  But it does so by working 
with journalists, not against them.   
What follows is an examination and analysis of the origins and practices of the press 
regulatory bodies of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, together with 
an exploration of current  issues and solutions adopted, and the identification of 
future issues deriving from convergence, accountability and effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
 
Self-regulation hardly has the best of reputations.  Whether it relates to lawyers, MPs 
or the press, there is inherent suspicion about any group that appears to regulate from within.  
Scepticism, however, is perfectly healthy and should ensure that those who oversee such 
regulatory frameworks do not rest on their laurels.  Equally, critics of self-regulation should 
take care that calls for change don’t risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
Press self-regulation has had a chequered history in both the jurisdictions that are the 
subject of this paper.  The outline of the long and ultimately successful campaign to set up a 
press council and press ombudsman in Ireland offers a useful check-list of the major issues 
that will arise in relation to any initiative of this kind.  In the United Kingdom, the old system 
of self-regulation, embodied in the Press Council, foundered in the late 1980s amid serious 
doubts about its ability to rein in the worst excesses of an excessively intrusive press.  And 
since its inception in 1991 the Press Complaints Commission has – from time to time – been 
the subject of cynical debate in certain quarters. 
Nevertheless, press self-regulation is now regarded as more acceptable, both 
nationally and internationally, than at any previous time.  Press councils exist in most 
European countries and have experienced particular growth in the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe.  Across Canada, Australasia and increasingly in Africa and South America, 
self-regulation of the press – and indeed, the media – shows its worth. 
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The case of the United Kingdom 
 
The importance of flexibility  
 
The characteristic which most enables self-regulatory systems to be successful is also 
the one that means they are not all alike – flexibility.  No two press councils are the same and 
even in the context of a converged and globalised media, it is entirely proper that this should 
be the case. 
Indeed, regulatory structures can be so different that ‘self-regulation’ is not 
necessarily a helpful way of describing them all.  What if a press council is funded by 
government on a “no-strings attached” basis – can that be self-regulation?  What if the staff 
of a press council are all non-journalists?  And what if the majority of those who make 
decisions on individual cases are unconnected to the newspaper industry?  All councils 
perform similar functions but they would not all recognize each other’s constitutions. 
In the case of the UK, it is well-known that the funding of the Press Complaints 
Commission comes fully from the press, via the Press Standards Board of Finance. And the 
Code of Practice, which the Commission administers, is written and updated by a committee 
of editors, albeit taking account of submissions from the public, pressure groups and the PCC 
itself.  However, the make up of the Commission’s board is the least industry oriented of any 
European equivalent – 17 members, of whom 10 (including the Chairman) effectively 
represent the public (Bertrand, Claude Jean, 2003 pp1-5).  The situation in Ireland is similar, 
as noted later. 
Whatever the name (and ‘self-regulation’ will have to do for now), the basic make up 
of these regulatory structures makes them singularly well-suited to providing the kind of 
service that members of the public want in reality: one that is straightforward, speedy and 
successful at obtaining useful outcomes to complaints.  Additionally, systems of non-
statutory regulation tend to be collaborative rather than confrontational and can also, 
therefore, be beneficial from the point of view of journalists and publishers.    
 
The work of the PCC 
 
It is in order to fulfil the public’s desire for useful solutions that the Press Complaints 
Commission focuses much of its work on mediation: arranging apologies; negotiating 
corrections; settling disputes by private deals and so on.  But this is not to say that the 
Commission neglects its role as adjudicator, for that is just as crucial.  Indeed, it is precisely 
because editors are fearful of an adverse adjudication that they will generally take steps to 
remedy mistakes at an early stage.  Without the threat of a public ruling against a newspaper 
or magazine, many complainants would not get a speedy apology or correction, which is 
generally what they want.  The mediation and adjudication functions work hand in hand.   
It is sometimes suggested that Ofcom, the statutory broadcast regulator is a more 
effective body than the PCC because it rules on a higher proportion of complaints.  The truth 
is that the organisations are comparable on this measure.  In 2008 the PCC made 1,420 
rulings, having received 4,698 complaints (Press Complaints Commission, 2008 Annual 
Review pp26-28).  Ofcom, which received 67,742 programme complaints, made 12,532 
(Ofcom, 2007-08 Annual Review p42).  Because one ruling may deal with a number of 
complaints about the same item, the number of rulings will always be smaller than the grand 
total of cases.  Overall, however, the PCC makes a decision on every case that falls within its 
remit and that includes enough information to make a judgment possible – just like Ofcom.   
3 
 
True, the PCC does not levy fines, which arguably do not benefit the public anyway, 
but that is because it operates a system which seeks to incentivise amicable settlements to 
complaints and which aims to be as unlegalistic as possible.  Given that the Commission does 
not act as a protector of public morals by dealing with matters of offensiveness, the 
complaints it investigates are almost always about personal issues.  Consequently, the people 
who use the PCC want an outcome that actually means something – a correction, an apology, 
an assurance about future reporting, sometimes an ex gratia payment.  For an editor, there is 
the knowledge that – extreme cases aside – a ruling by the Commission will not be made (or 
might be less critical) if he or she makes prompt and genuine efforts to make amends for an 
inadvertent breach of the Code.  In 2008, over 550 complaints were settled to the satisfaction 
of complainants or, in PCC jargon, ‘resolved’ (Press Complaints Commission, Newsletter 
February 2009).  Ofcom – with which, it should be said, the PCC has an excellent 
relationship – managed 25. 
Some have suggested that the Commission should rule on these ‘resolved’ cases 
instead.  But that manifestly ignores the interests of the parties involved in the complaints, 
especially where speed of corrective action is crucial.  Indeed, it is unlikely that people would 
demand that a libel trial proceed even when the parties have come to an out of court 
settlement – yet it is fundamentally the same process which the PCC oversees. 
 
Self-regulation and the law – choice is good 
 
Comparisons between the PCC and the law are made often but rarely well.  Indeed, it 
is not unusual for the two institutions to be considered as competitors and yet that is a long 
way from the truth.  The distinction between inaccuracy and defamation is generally obvious 
enough.  But even in privacy cases, where the Commission and the courts are dealing with 
similar material and principles, the services they offer are complementary, not 
confrontational.  And the fact that potential complainants therefore have a choice when it 
comes to seeking relief or remedy is surely beneficial. 
For those who wish to make a splash or seek compensatory damages, following 
publication of an intrusive story, the courts may be attractive.  Similarly, a formally binding 
injunction is, of course, only achievable via the legal route. 
But for many others the PCC is a more attractive option.  It is free; rulings are 
obtained in an average of 36 days; the approach is non-adversarial; and details of complaints 
can be kept confidential.  When a person wishes to restrict further invasions of their privacy, 
a much-publicised court hearing may not be the ideal way to proceed. 
And increasingly, the Commission has developed a pre-publication role that can have 
a very real impact on the way a story appears – if, indeed, it appears at all.  Available 24 
hours a day, the PCC’s staff will pass on legitimate concerns to newspapers and magazines 
and work quickly with both parties to try and resolve matters before a situation gets out of 
control.  Last year, for example, a national newspaper intended to publish a story about a 
dentist who was infected with HIV and Hepatitis C.  The individual made clear that he was 
following established protocol in terms of handling the difficult situation and that there was 
no public interest in the wider dissemination of details of his illness.  After discussion, the 
newspaper agreed not to proceed with publication. 
The service can also be used to deal with harassment or potential harassment.  The 
television newsreader Natasha Kaplinsky used the PCC to circulate concerns she had about 
the likelihood of media attention on her and her newborn child.  She said afterwards: 
 “When I had my baby I didn’t want to be followed around by 
photographers every time I left the house.  We asked the PCC to issue a 
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private request to photographers to stop following us, and to newspapers 
and magazines not to use pictures of me taken when I was with my family in 
private time.  The degree of compliance was very impressive...” (Press 
Complaints Commission, 2008 Annual Review, pp 6-9) 
During the course of the year, the PCC helps many dozens of people with concerns 
about as yet unpublished material.  And in terms of privacy complaints about published 
material, the Commission made 327 rulings in 2008, a 35% increase on 2007.  The 
predictions of people ten years ago who said that the PCC’s privacy work would wither away 
as people turned to the courts have simply failed to materialize (Toulmin, Tim 2009). 
 
Moving with the times – in the UK and elsewhere 
 
The fact that press councils are most popular at a time when the media is changing 
most rapidly is not, perhaps, a coincidence.  The flexibility of non-statutory systems assists in 
the day-to-day resolution of specific cases.  But their non-legislative, unbureaucratic basis 
also allows most press councils to respond effectively to wider changes in technology or 
cultural attitudes. 
In the United Kingdom, the Code of Practice overseen by the PCC is a constantly 
evolving document.  In 1998, following the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, it was 
substantially rewritten in light of concerns about protection from unjustified intrusion.  In 
2006, after the submission of evidence from the Samaritans, a new section on suicide 
reporting was introduced (Press Complaints Commission website, ‘The Evolving Code’). 
The Commission itself has changed considerably since its establishment in 1991.  In 
2003, to improve accountability, the proportion of public members on the board of the 
Commission was increased.  Open advertising for lay Commissioners was also introduced.  
And to improve accessibility, the PCC introduced a 24-hour a day emergency helpline.  More 
recently, the Commission has developed its system of pre-publication ‘advisory notices’ to 
deal with problems before they arise.  And it has acted to close what could have become a 
loophole in its regulatory reach – namely, audio-visual material on newspaper and magazine 
websites.   
Press councils elsewhere have also been able to respond flexibly to changing 
circumstances.  In Bosnia, in 2006, the self-regulatory Press Council was disbanded and 
immediately re-established with a new, more suitable management and funding structure.  
The absence of foreign input, which had been necessary when the Press Council was first set 
up in 2000, allowed the building of foundations that took into account the peculiarities of the 
Bosnian situation. 
In Switzerland, the Press Council has worked for years to bring publishers into the 
fold, realising that it would be far more effective if newspaper management co-operated with 
the system, rather than fighting against it.  In Germany, the Deutscher Presserat has expanded 
its jurisdiction to include material on newspaper websites that has not appeared also in print 
editions.  And in Canada, state-based councils have agreed to work more closely together in 
order to develop a more collaborative approach (Gore, William 2008). 
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The case of the Republic of Ireland 
 
Background and structure 
 
The question of establishing a regulatory authority for the print media in Ireland has 
been under discussion since the early 1980s, in part as a response to the decision of the Irish 
government in 1976 to set up a Broadcasting Complaints Commission for the broadcasting 
sector. The media sector itself, however, evinced little interest in demands from external 
pressure groups, notably trade unions, and concentrated its reformist energies on a campaign 
to update the country’s defamation legislation, which by then had remained unchanged for 
over two decades. The latter campaign gained an impetus with the publication of a report by 
the Irish Law Reform Commission in 1991 which recommended that defamation law be 
modernised, but the question of independent or self-regulation by the media was not 
addressed institutionally until the Report of the Commission on the Newspaper Industry 
(1996), on which Commission major newspaper interests were represented. The Report of 
this Commission balanced its demands for preferential VAT treatment for newspapers and 
reform of the defamation laws with acceptance of the idea of a Press Ombudsman. The 
Commission’s view was that Ireland, as a small jurisdiction with fewer than four million 
inhabitants, did not need the panoply of a full Press Council. 
Nothing further happened until the appointment of Michael McDowell as Minister for 
Justice in 2002. The minister’s enthusiasm for media regulation - not unusual among 
politicians – suggested to media interests that the inauguration of a system of media 
regulation independent of government might be an acceptable quid pro quo for reform of the 
law on defamation, and this was implicitly accepted by the government. The Defamation Bill 
that was introduced into parliament in 2006 empowers the Minister to “recognise” a Press 
Council and Press Ombudsman. The effect of such recognition is to afford both parts of the 
structure qualified privilege in relation to any statements or decisions they may make, and in 
relation to its documents and internal proceedings. The State has no role in relation to the 
funding, appointment or membership of the Press Council or of the Press Ombudsman, 
although it may withdraw recognition, and the associated legal protections, if, in its opinion, 
the conditions specified for recognition are no longer being met. Only one Press Council and 
Press Ombudsman may be recognized at any time. 
Although the Bill’s progress was interrupted by the 2007 general election, it was re-
introduced in 2008 and is currently in its final stages. In advance of its enactment, as an 
earnest of good faith, the media industry took the necessary steps to establish the Press 
Council in July 2007, and the Council appointed its first Press Ombudsman with effect from 
September 2007. The new structure began to handle complaints on 2 January 2008.  
This model was devised over a four-year period by a Press Industry Steering Group 
under the chairmanship of Professor Thomas Mitchell, former Provost of Trinity College, 
Dublin, which included individuals representing the public interest, media managements, and 
the National Union of Journalists. It studied different models in different countries, and 
decided against the adoption of any pre-existing template, but created an innovative structure 
which has visible antecedents in the structures operating in Britain and in Sweden. Its major 
similarity with the British system is in the fact that the Council has a lay, or public interest, 
majority. Its resemblance to the Swedish system is in its provision for appeals to the Press 
Council from decisions of the Press Ombudsman, although the relationships between the 
Press Ombudsman and Press Council in each country, and the two appeals mechanisms, 
differ substantially.  In the Irish model, designed to reduce the possibility of duplication and 
overlap between the work of the Press Ombudsman and that of the Council, appellants must 
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first of all satisfy the Council that they have adequate grounds for their appeal (dissatisfaction 
with the Ombudsman’s decision is not sufficient) before the Council will consider it in detail. 
The Press Council of Ireland, and its chairman, are appointed by an Appointments 
Committee that does not include any industry representatives. The Press Council consists of 
six members nominated by the industry (three from national newspapers, one from regional 
newspapers, one from periodicals, and one from the National Union of Journalists), and seven 
members representing the public interest, chosen by the Appointments Committee following 
public advertisement. All are part-time. Its operational procedures require that public interest 
members must be in a majority when decisions are being taken. It meets monthly.  
A feature of its membership is that it includes members from UK-based newspapers 
circulating in Ireland. It is legally constituted as a company under the Companies Acts, and 
has two committees, a Code Committee and an Administration Committee. The Code 
Committee, composed of editors, the Press Ombudsman, and a representative of the National 
Union of Journalists, has oversight of the Code of Practice. The Administration Committee 
comprises senior executives of the member publications: its function is to agree an annual 
budget with the Press Council and to organize the funding of the Council through annual 
subscriptions from member publications. Its Chairman is a public interest member of the 
Press Council. 
 The Press Ombudsman is appointed by the Press Council, but is independent in the 
performance of his functions. His primary function is to hear complaints about the press, to 
conciliate such complaints where possible, and to make decisions on complaints that have not 
been successfully conciliated. He also has the right, at his discretion, to refer some significant 
or complicated cases directly to the Press Council for a decision. 
 These details raise the issue of whether the Irish model ought to be described as self-
regulatory or as an independent regulatory mechanism. The fact that it has been set up and is 
financed by the media industry itself lends support to the idea that it is self-regulatory, but the 
fact that the public interest members of the Press Council are in a majority, the independence 
of the Press Ombudsman, and the non-involvement of the funders in management, are strong 
arguments for describing it as independent. The fact that the Appointments Committee, rather 
than the industry itself, not only made all the original appointments, but will continue to 
exercise that role in the future, is a further guarantee of the independence of the structure.  
 
The state of play 
 
The publicity that greeted the official launch of the new structures in January 2008 
generated a substantial volume of complaints, but some of these, inevitably, related to articles 
published before the starting date and could not be considered. There was a brief public issue 
caused by the resignation of one of the public interest members of the Press Council, who 
disagreed with the Council’s adoption of a policy that its published decisions on complaints 
or appeals should not include the text of any dissenting opinions by Council members. 
However, the first full year’s activities demonstrated growing public confidence in and 
goodwill towards the new structures, as evidenced by the growing success of the conciliation 
procedures. In relation to complaints involving formal decisions by the Press Ombudsman, 
37.2% were upheld or partially upheld, and 51.4% were not upheld (Annual Report 2008: 
Press Council of Ireland and Office of the Press Ombudsman). The two complaints referred 
directly to the Press Council for investigation and decision were each upheld in part. A 
relatively small proportion of complaints are lodged by lawyers on behalf of the 
complainants, but – given the adversarial approach implicit in this – they have tended to 
account for a disproportionate share of the workload. The total number of complaints 
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(including those ineligible for investigation, withdrawn, or not proceeded with for other 
reasons) was 372, not far behind the 500-odd complaints received by Ireland’s Broadcasting 
Complaints Commission. 
In its first year of operation, 25 of the 35 formal decisions made by the Press 
Ombudsman were appealed to the Press Council.  Only five appeals were admitted for full 
consideration and, of these five, three were turned down, one was upheld and one was 
partially upheld. The prime form of redress for complainants is, where complaints have been 
upheld by the Press Ombudsman or on appeal by the Press Council, that the publications 
concerned have to publish the decision in full and with due prominence. The experience of 
the Office is that this sanction, contrary to some public perceptions, is keenly felt by the 
publications concerned. 
 One important aspect of the work of the new structures is that it encompasses all 
major daily and weekly newspapers circulating in the country, regardless of whether they are 
Irish or UK-based publications. It was widely recognized at the outset that restricting the 
scope of the structures to Irish-originated publications would defeat the whole purpose of the 
exercise: roughly one in every four daily newspapers bought in Ireland are Irish editions of 
UK-based papers such as the Daily Mirror, The Star, the Sun and the Daily Mail, and roughly 
one in three of Sunday papers bought in Ireland comes similarly from a UK stable, including 
the Sunday Times. These Irish editions carry substantial coverage of Irish affairs and are not 
merely ‘badged’ for the Irish market.  
The involvement of the UK-based papers in membership of the new Irish regulatory 
system was initially problematic because the structure envisaged was one in which  the Press 
Council and the Office of the Press Ombudsman would be formally mentioned in the 
proposed defamation legislation. This went against the grain of UK press sensibilities, long 
opposed to State or political regulation of the sector in any shape or form. However, this 
potential objection was removed as it became clear that no Irish government would have any 
input into the new structures, in terms of membership, policy or financing, and that the 
statutory recognition to be afforded by the proposed legislation would be solely for the 
purpose of affording greater protection than hitherto, not only to newspapers, but also to the 
Press Council and the Press Ombudsman.  
 Questions of confidentiality also arose in relation to the publication of decisions.  
Under data protection legislation, complainants are entitled to maintain anonymity in any 
published decision, and this right was frequently availed of. On occasion, complainants who 
had given permission for publication of their name, and whose complaint had subsequently 
not been upheld, decided to withdraw this permission in the interval between the original 
decision and the hearing of an appeal. 
 As might be anticipated, developing the public outreach of the new structures has 
been a feature of much of the early activity of the Press Council and the Press Ombudsman. 
An initial public meeting on the issues connected with the reporting of crime in the press took 
place in Limerick, a city much associated with gangland crime, and was preceded by a 
surgery or clinic in which the Press Ombudsman and members of his staff were available to 
members of the public generally. Towards the end of 2008, the Press Council carried out an 
extensive public consultation on the reporting of suicide in the media as part of another 
initiative aimed both at making the public more aware of the Council and its activities, and 
promoting public discussion about the issues and sensitivities involved.  
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Conclusions 
 
The major challenges and opportunities 
 
No matter whether a self-regulatory regime is young, as in Ireland, or longer-
established, as in the UK, none can stand still.  Future challenges and opportunities need to be 
considered in the light of a number of developments, all of them inter-related to some degree. 
 
1. Technological Change 
Technological change is affecting the print media with dramatic suddenness, and with 
consequences that few can at this stage foresee. Some things are obvious: the growing 
web presence of newspapers themselves, and the increasing availability of media 
websites (including newspaper websites) for user-generated content. The former 
objective runs the risk of putting a premium on entertainment-related content and on 
rapidity of delivery, brevity, and celebrity. The risk from both is that rumour rather 
than verifiability becomes the default mode, with content providers being ranked 
more in terms of their reliability as purveyors of rumour than in terms of the 
verifiability of the information or the depth of analysis they provide.  On the other 
hand, there may – in this scenario – be an opportunity for trustworthy outlets to 
promote themselves on the basis of their accountability to a system of self-regulation 
The definition of journalism itself, and of journalists, is also becoming more porous. 
 
2. Economic Change 
The migration of readers and advertisers to the web, although apparently not as 
pronounced as some doom-sayers believe1, has substantial implications for the 
economic model of traditional print journalism, which is responding by (a) attempting 
to find ways to monetize their web presence or secure additional revenue streams for 
their print products, and (b) attempting to cut costs so as to maintain profit levels and 
shareholder satisfaction. The latter objective has serious implications for quality 
control in newspapers, as older and more experienced (and more expensive) 
newspaper staff members are replaced by less well trained younger staff. Taken 
together, these trends also create a risk that the costs of regulation will become less 
acceptable to media managements, and that regulation of any sort will be seen by 
owners and managers as an optional extra and not a particularly welcome one at that. 
 
3. Accountability 
There is a growing political trend towards greater accountability, and media regulators 
are no more immune to it than other social institutions. Many media accountability 
systems – generally voluntary, such as those that make up the Alliance of Independent 
Press Councils of Europe (AIPCE) – may increasingly have to combat the allegation 
that they have been set up merely to prevent the introduction of state (i.e. political) 
regulation, or as a front-of-house initiative by the industry designed to deflect 
criticism and curb the press’s major excesses but without making any fundamental 
change. If these criticisms cannot be satisfactorily countered, the only form of 
accountability with any real muscle will be the marketplace – which cannot be relied 
on to guarantee quality in this complex and socially significant area – or, ultimately, 
statutory measures, with the attendant risk to press freedom. 
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4. Effectiveness 
Independent assessment of the work of press regulatory systems – their effectiveness, 
responsiveness, and power to maintain standards and enforce desired change will 
increasingly become an issue. Several European institutions (OSCE, Council of 
Europe, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights) have already taken steps in this 
direction.  But assessment which has a political agenda can only be so useful and it is 
important that press councils themselves are alive to finding and monitoring measures 
of effectiveness. Although the composition, structures and remits of different 
regulatory structures vary considerably, it may be possible to promote, perhaps within 
an organization like AIPCE, a continuous exchange of views and experiences as they 
develop in the context of local circumstances so that a model of best professional 
practice for regulatory bodies can begin to emerge.  
 
The final word 
 
Convergence forces everyone involved in journalism, including media regulators, to 
face up to new challenges.  But non-statutory regulation is ideally suited to reacting quickly 
to a changing and rather fluid environment.  Relationships between press councils will 
become closer, although there will still be differences between national regulatory regimes. 
Regulators will become increasingly accountable – there has, indeed, already been significant 
movement in this direction2.  And they will also have to strive constantly to raise levels of 
effectiveness.  The UK PCC regularly surveys those who receive a decision from the 
Commission and in 2008, out of 228 people who returned their feedback forms, 83% thought 
their complaint had been dealt with ‘thoroughly’ or ‘very thoroughly’.  That’s good but there 
is clearly room for improvement. The Irish Press Council will shortly be commissioning an 
independent external review of its first period of operations. 
But overall, when it comes to providing effective results for complainants – within a 
framework that does not have the potential to damage press freedom – non-statutory, 
independent regulation, of the type seen across Europe, is the most desirable way ahead. 
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Notes 
 
1.  The establishment of the Charter Compliance Panel, for instance, and the position of the 
Charter Commissioner to scrutinise the work of the PCC.  For more information see 
www.pcc.org.uk/about/whoswho/index   
 
2.  See the mildly optimistic prognosis at 
http://www.pwc.com/images/em/NewsPaperOutlook2009.pdf 
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